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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of a potential spillover on technology transfer of a
multinational enterprise and on the host country policy. In particular, we examine how
both parties’ incentives can be controlled through the ownership structure in an interna-
tional joint venture. In contrast to existing arguments we show that spillovers must not
always have negative effects on technology transfer and they may be efficiency improving.
Moreover, there are circumstances where a joint venture is mutually beneficial. Surpris-
ingly, however, we find that despite the prospect of spillovers a joint venture is sometimes
not in the interest of a host country.
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1 Introduction
Multinational firms are frequently confronted with restrictions about the ownership structure of
their foreign operation by local governments. In particular, developing and transition countries
often impose shared ownership agreements, hoping that this might facilitate beneficial tech-
nology spillovers for their local industries. Multinationals, on the other hand, are not always
happy about such forced international joint ventures, precisely because of the risk of involuntary
spillovers.1
In this paper we examine whether it is indeed in the local government’s best interest to im-
pose a joint venture agreement and whether it is in the multinational’s interest to oppose such
a requirement. For this purpose we study how the ownership structure of a multinational sub-
sidiary affects the multinational’s incentives to transfer technology and the local government’s
incentive to support the multinational’s activities.
The ownership structure is particularly important when the multinational’s competitive
advantage stems from intangible assets or technological leadership. Sharing of ownership gives
rise to the possibility of technology spillovers. This might be due to the fact that it is difficult
to write a contract exactly specifying all aspects of the joint venture and the rights to use
the intangible assets or technology. The problem of spillovers should be reduced when the
multinational enterprise (MNE) owns a substantial part of the foreign firm.2 Thus, the two
levels of ownership, wholly owned versus partially owned, should have different implications
for the transfer and diffusion of technology. In order to minimize the potential loss through
a spillover a MNE would prefer full ownership of its local subsidiary. But there also exist
good reasons why the MNE would voluntarily agree to share ownership. Maybe otherwise the
full return of the intangible assets or of the superior technology cannot be achieved because
the MNE lacks local experience. Moreover, direct investments are subject to sovereign risks.
1Such restrictions have been and still are prominent in countries like Russia, China, India, Indonesia, the
Republic of Korea and many others (UNCTC [1987]). Moreover, in privatization practice governments often
retained a substantial share of the privatized assets (Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco [2003], Maw [2002]).
2This argument is in line with the property rights approach put forward in the seminal papers by Grossman
and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990]. Ownership entitles the owner with all residual rights of control
over all aspects of the asset.
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This issue is particularly important in countries in transition. A government can, for example,
choose to indirectly expropriate the assets of a direct investment through excessive taxation.
By sharing ownership the MNE might be able to reduce the problem of lack of local experience
or the sovereign risk problem.
There exists a large and growing literature on the transfer of knowledge and technology
between countries and its impact on the productivity of domestic firms.3 Two channels for the
transfer of know-how can be distinguished: International trade and FDI. International trade can
be a source of spillovers through demonstration effects when domestic firms learn the innovative
content of imported goods. Coe and Helpman [1995], Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister [1997], and
Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie [1998] examine the influence of foreign trade
partners’ R&D on domestic total factor productivity. The empirical results confirm that foreign
R&D influences domestic productivity and that the more open countries are to international
trade the more they benefit.4 FDI as a channel of technology transfer has been examined in
Kokko [1994], Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee [1998], Aitken and Harrison [1999] and Xu
[2000].5 The empirical results of theses studies are substantially different.6 Kokko, Borensztein
et al. and Xu show that positive spillovers are more likely if the technology gap between foreign
and domestic firms is not too large and if there exists a minimum threshold of human capital.7
Aitken and Harrison find negative spillovers from foreign investment on domestically owned
plants and state that the gains from FDI appear to be entirely captured by joint ventures.8
There also exists some work on the interaction of spillovers and the ownership structure
3See Saggi [2001] or Blomstro¨m and Kokko [1998] for recent surveys on international technology transfer and
spillovers.
4Keller [1998] doubts the importance of international trade patterns and shows that randomly created trade
patterns also give rise to positive international R&D spillovers, which are often larger and explain more of the
variation in productivity across countries. Keller [2002] finds that benefits from foreign spillovers decline with
geographical distance.
5The earliest statistical studies of FDI and intra-industry spillovers are Caves [1974] and Globerman [1979].
6Go¨rg and Strobl [2001] review the literature on multinational companies and productivity spillovers. They
argue that the empirical methods used and whether cross-section or panel analysis is employed may have an
effect on the empirical results.
7While a certain technology gap obviously is necessary for spillovers to occur, this finding seems to limit
the assumption (e.g. in Findlay [1978] or Wang and Blomstro¨m [1992]) that spillovers grow with the size of the
technology gap.
8Other studies which found evidence for negative spillovers include Haddad and Harrison [1993] or Djankov
and Hoekman [2000].
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in joint ventures. Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm [1999] analyze the effects of shared ownership on
technology transfer and spillovers. They argue that, as generally believed, local participation
with multinationals reveals their proprietary knowledge and in that way facilitates spillovers.
This in turn might provide less incentive for the multinational to transfer technology and
management skills. Their empirical results show that domestic establishments benefit from
spillovers in terms of productivity levels, but the degree of foreign ownership does not affect
the extent of it. In contrast, Dimelis and Louri [2002] find evidence that the degree of foreign
ownership matters, and productivity spillovers are found to be stronger when foreign firms are
in minority positions.9 Nakamura and Xie [1998] consider a situation with bilateral spillovers.
They argue that full ownership and joint ventures should differ with respect to the diffusion of
technology. The ownership share should reflect the relative importance of the intangible assets
which the partners bring into the joint venture. Their empirical results confirm that imports
from the foreign mother and the share of exports from total revenue have a significant positive
effect, while R&D expenditures of the local partner have a significant negative effect on MNE’s
share.
The other strand of literature that is related to our approach concerns the effects of
sovereign risks on foreign direct investment.10 Eaton and Gersovitz [1983] discuss a reputation
model of FDI with many potential investors. If the host country taxes excessively, potential
future investors are deterred and the host country loses access to foreign capital. In a compan-
ion paper, Eaton and Gersovitz [1984] show that the threat of nationalization may induce the
foreign investor to choose an inefficient technology which makes nationalization less attractive
to the host country.11
Schnitzer [2002] analyzes the choice between FDI and a combination of debt finance and
a licensing agreement in the presence of sovereign risk. One result of this static model is that
9Explanations for the contrasting results of these studies could be the different development levels of the
economies examined and differing econometric methodologies used.
10Not relevant for our discussion is the problem of sovereign debt. See Eaton [1993] and Eaton and Fernandez
[1995] for recent surveys.
11Similar issues have been addressed in the literature on incomplete contracts. The classical notion of the
hold-up problem goes back to Williamson [1985].
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the sovereign risk problem can be alleviated if the host country and the foreign investor form
a joint venture.12 In particular, it is shown that there are circumstances where a joint venture
can be efficiency improving and where the MNE voluntarily agrees to it. This is caused by the
fact that by sharing ownership the host country is given an incentive to reduce taxation.13
We ask in particular: How does a potential spillover affect the incentive for a MNE to
transfer technology and the policy incentives of the host country? Moreover, we examine
how the incentives of both parties can be controlled through the ownership structure in an
international joint venture. A spillover directly reduces the profit of the multinational and
benefits a domestic (state-owned) firm. We make a distinction between the potential for a
spillover and the effective spillover. The potential for a spillover determines the potential
benefit to a domestic firm and is taken as exogenously given. The effective spillover contains
the benefit that actually occurs and this is endogenously determined. The extent of the effective
spillover depends on the technology transfer and on the ownership structure. We argue that
the better the transferred technology and the larger the domestic ownership share, the larger
will be the effective spillover. With respect to the host country policy we analyze two different
scenarios: In scenario 1, the host country chooses the total amount of taxes to be paid and
has thus the option to expropriate the entire return stream of the project. In scenario 2,
the host country does not impose a tax but has the option to invest in local infrastructure.
The difference between the two scenarios is that the tax can only be raised if the project was
successful, while the investment in infrastructure is undertaken independently of the project’s
success. Thus, the investment cannot be interpreted as just a negative tax, i.e. a subsidy. This
implies a substantial difference in the strategic choice of the two policies and their impact on
technology transfer. In particular, taxation may serve as a perfect substitute for a spillover,
while an infrastructure investment in general cannot perfectly compensate for a spillover.
12Schnitzer [1999] shows in a dynamic model of FDI how cooperation may be sustained. In particular, it
is shown that sovereign risk may induce over- as well as underinvestment. Moreover, the frequently observed
phenomenon of tax holidays is discussed.
13Konrad and Lommerud [2001] show that asymmetric information between the MNE and the host country as
regards intra-firm trade between the MNE and its foreign affiliate is another possibility to alleviate the hold-up
problem in FDI. By selling shares of the affiliate to locals the host government is given a further incentive to
reduce taxation.
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The results of our model show for both scenarios that a potential spillover need not in
general have a negative effect on the incentive to transfer technology. In particular, in contrast
to generally believed arguments, we can show that there are situations where a spillover has a
positive effect on the transfer of technology, on both parties’ payoffs, and on the efficiency of
the project. The extent of the effective spillover increases with the domestic firm’s ownership
share in the joint venture, while the risk of creeping expropriation decreases or the incentive to
invest in local infrastructure increases. These effects indicate that an extreme form of ownership
(wholly owned or no equity but licensing) should not always be optimal for the MNE since one
of the effects might destroy the incentive to transfer technology. Our results confirm for both
scenarios that there are circumstances where a joint venture is mutually beneficial. Moreover,
we ask whether or not it should always be in the interest of the host country to form a joint
venture. This question is of particular interest to countries in Central and Eastern Europe
and other transition countries, where sharing of ownership is often required by host country
governments. However, we show that there exist cases where it is in the interest of the host
country to reduce the domestic firm’s ownership share or even not to share ownership.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model. Section 3 analyzes
the effect of spillovers on technology transfer and the incentives for excessive taxation. In
section 4, we derive the results for the case of spillovers and investment by the host country.
Section 5 discusses empirical implications of the model, while the final section concludes.
2 The Model
When a multinational enterprise engages in foreign direct investment it is often observed that
this is done by forming a joint venture with a local firm. In countries in Central and Eastern
Europe the joint venture partner often is a state-owned firm. Sometimes the multinational is
forced to give away some share of the project without any compensation which is nothing but
some special form of expropriation.
Consider the following relationship between a multinational enterprise (MNE) and a state-
owned company in a host country (HC). The MNE seeks to employ an investment opportunity
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in HC. This investment cannot be carried out by the domestic firm, because HC does not have
enough funds available to finance the investment project and cannot obtain a credit on the
international capital market. The investment project requires an initial outlay I. Without loss
of generality we assume the riskless world interest rate to be zero. If the project is not carried
out, both parties get their outside utilities, which are normalized to zero.14
MNE and HC can engage in a joint venture where HC receives some share 1 − α of the
project’s net profits. MNE gets the remainder of profits and possesses the control rights of the
project. In a first step we assume α to be exogenously given in period t = 1. Considering the
role of the host country in t = 2 we analyze two different scenarios: In scenario 1, the host
country has the option to expropriate the entire return stream through taxation. HC chooses
the total amount of taxes, T , to be paid. In scenario 2, we assume that the host country does
not impose a tax but has the option to undertake an investment, M , on its own in order for the
project to be valuable. HC chooses the amount of M , which directly benefits the project. M
may be interpreted as an investment in local infrastructure and has to be spent independently
of the project’s success. The difference between the two scenarios is that the tax T can only be
raised if the project has been successful, while the investment M will be spent independently
of the project’s success. Thus, M cannot be interpreted as just a negative tax, i.e. a subsidy.
In t = 3 MNE has to engage in additional actions, q, which affect the profitability of the
project. For example, MNE may decide on the level of investment in training local workers and
managers, in marketing the produced goods, transferring or upgrading technology. In t = 4
profits are realized. The time structure is summarized in the following figure:
- t
t = 0
I
t = 1
α, 1− α
t = 2
Scenario 1: T
Scenario 2: M
t = 3
q
t = 4
payoffs
realized
Figure 1: sequence of events
14In principle, there are two possibilities to finance and run the project: debt finance and foreign direct
investment. Since we are interested in determining factors of ownership structure in international joint ventures
we will consider the case of FDI. See Schnitzer [2002] for an analysis of the choice between FDI and debt finance.
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The project’s return is stochastic and may be either R or 0. The probability of success is affected
by MNE’s decision to transfer technology in t = 3. Without loss of generality we assume that
MNE chooses the probability of success, q ∈ (0, 1), directly at cost K(q). K(q) is an increasing,
strictly convex function with K ′(0) = 0 and limq→1K(q) = ∞. The last assumption implies
that for q sufficiently close to 1, K ′′′(q) > 0. To guarantee uniqueness of the solutions for the
following maximization problems, we assume K ′′′(q) > 0 for all q ∈ (0, 1). We assume that
HC does not only share the revenues but also the costs from the subsequent investment into
technology transfer. Therefore, it is assumed that a substantial part of these costs will be in
local currency and thus HC can share these costs even without access to international capital
markets or hard currency.
In scenario 2, where HC chooses an investment, M , the cost of investment, C(M), is borne
by HC alone. C(M) is an increasing, strictly convex function with C ′(0) = 0. We assume that
HC is able to finance this infrastructure investment in local currency.
If the project is carried out in form of a joint venture there is potential for a spillover
S from MNE to HC, where S is exogenously given. The spillover directly reduces the profit
of MNE and benefits HC. We assume that the size of the effective spillover depends on two
things: First, it depends on the decision to transfer technology and therefore on the probability
of success q. Second, the ownership share 1−α of HC matters. The first assumption emphasizes
that the better the transferred technology the larger is the potential gain from a spillover to
HC. The second assumption reflects the fact that the size of the effective spillover depends on
the ability to get access to the MNE’s technology. The possibility to get a closer look at the
special features of the technology and know-how certainly depends on the participation of HC.
Thus, the effective spillover is equal to q(1−α)S. The spillover can be efficient in the sense that
the direct reduction of the multinational’s payoff is smaller than the benefit for the domestic
firm and vice versa for an inefficient spillover. In order to be able to vary the efficiency of
the spillover we introduce an efficiency parameter β > 0. For β = 1 the effective spillover is
symmetric, i.e. the loss for MNE equals the benefit to HC. If β < 1 the effective spillover is
efficient and vice versa for β > 1.
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We can now define the payoffs for both parties in the two scenarios. In scenario 1, where
HC chooses the total amount of taxes, T , to be paid, the parties’ payoffs are
UTMNE = qα[R− T ]− q(1− α)βS − αK(q)− I, (1)
and
UTHC = q
[
(1− α)[R− T + S] + T
]
− (1− α)K(q). (2)
In scenario 2, where HC chooses investment in infrastructure M , payoffs are
UMMNE = qα[R +M ]− q(1− α)βS − αK(q)− I, (3)
and
UMHC = q(1− α)[R +M + S]− C(M)− (1− α)K(q). (4)
3 Spillovers and Taxation by the Host Country
Consider MNE’s decision on how much to invest into transferring technology in the second
stage of the project. MNE maximizes (1). Given the assumptions on K(q) the optimal level of
investment q is uniquely characterized by the following first order condition:
K ′(qT ) = R− T − 1− α
α
βS. (5)
Note that qT (T, α) is a strictly decreasing function of T for all T ∈ (0, R − 1−α
α
βS). Note
further, that it depends directly on α, MNE’s share of profits, because of the existence of a
spillover.
When HC decides on the level of taxes to be imposed on the project it takes into account
the effect of T on qT (T, α) and thus on his own share of profits. HC maximizes (2). In the
Appendix we prove that HC’s maximization problem has a unique interior solution T T (α) ∈
(−(1 − α)β−αβ+α
α
S,R − 1−α
α
βS).15 Hence, the optimal amount of taxes T T (α) satisfies the
15See Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
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following first order condition:
dqT (T )
dT
[
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + T T
]
+ αqT (T ) = 0. (6)
Note that even if α = 1, HC will choose T T (1) < R such that MNE is induced to choose a
positive q. Moreover, it could be optimal for HC to choose a negative tax, i.e. a subsidy. The
reason for this is that in some circumstances only by subsidization MNE can be induced to
choose a positive q. In these situations the profit share and the effective spillover outweigh the
cost of the subsidy for HC.
How are the incentives to transfer technology and to raise taxes affected by the potential
spillover S? Intuitively, it should be argued that since a spillover directly reduces MNE’s payoff
its incentive to invest should decrease. At the same time a spillover should provide an incentive
for HC to reduce taxation. However, the parties’ decisions are interdependent. Hence, a change
in S has a direct effect on T T (α) and qT (T, α) and an indirect effect through the change in the
respective other variable.
We can show that the direct effects of an increase in S on both decisions are negative as
expected. And moreover, the overall effect on T T (α) is always negative. Thus, the indirect
effect on the investment qT (T, α) through the change in T T (α) is positive. Whether or not
this indirect effect dominates the direct effect of a spillover on qT (T, α) is a priori not clear.
We show that the effects of an increase in the potential spillover on the incentive to transfer
technology and on both parties’ payoffs depend on the efficiency of the spillover. In particular,
in case of an efficient spillover MNE is induced to increase its technology transfer which results
in a positive effect on the parties’ payoffs. The effects of an increase in the potential spillover on
the optimal tax rate, on the optimal investment, on both parties’ payoffs, and on total surplus
are summarized in the following result:
Proposition 1 Increasing S has the following effects on the optimal tax rate T T (α), on the op-
timal investment in technology transfer qT (T, α), on both parties’ payoffs, and on the efficiency
of the project:
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(i) β = 1: dT
T
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
= 0,
dUTMNE
dS
= 0,
dUTHC
dS
= 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dS
= 0.
(ii) β < 1: dT
T
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
> 0,
dUTMNE
dS
> 0,
dUTHC
dS
> 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dS
> 0.
(iii) β > 1: dT
T
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
< 0,
dUTMNE
dS
< 0,
dUTHC
dS
< 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dS
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
As a special case emerges the situation of a symmetric spillover, β = 1. In this case the
optimal tax rate is exactly adjusted for the spillover such that the optimal investment remains
unchanged compared to the case without a spillover, i.e. qT (T, α) = q∗(T ). To be more precise,
the taxation will be lowered such that in the aggregate the sum of tax rate and spillover is
equal to the taxation when there is no spillover, i.e. T T (α) = T ∗(α)− 1−α
α
S.16 Hence, for β = 1
taxation and spillover are perfect substitutes from HC’s point of view.
If the spillover is not symmetric, β 6= 1, it is not a perfect substitute for taxation. There-
fore, it has an effect on all variables, on the payoffs of both parties and on efficiency. The
indirect effect of an efficient spillover dominates the direct effect on qT (α) and vice versa for
an inefficient spillover. Therefore, the investment qT (α) increases (decreases) if the spillover is
efficient (inefficient). Intuitively we can argue that an efficient spillover, β < 1, does not harm
MNE too much but it fully benefits HC. The opposite is true for an inefficient spillover. As a
result of these effects the parties’ payoffs and the efficiency of the project also depend on the
magnitude of the spillover for β 6= 1. To be more precise, both parties’ payoffs, and therefore
the efficiency of the project, increase (decrease) in S for β < 1 (β > 1). We can summarize that
in contrast to widespread opinions a potential spillover need not in general reduce the incentive
to transfer technology or the efficiency of a joint venture.
How are the incentives of both parties affected by a change in the ownership structure?
Intuitively, it could be expected that decreasing the multinational’s ownership share α reduces
the incentive to transfer technology. On the other hand, the incentive for HC to choose an
excessive taxation is also reduced. Both effects should be more pronounced in the presence of a
16T ∗(α) and q∗(T ) characterize the optimal choices for S = 0.
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potential spillover. Which of these effects dominates is a priori not clear. Obviously, since the
parties’ incentives are affected by a potential spillover the effects of a change in the ownership
division should also depend on the spillover. The following proposition summarizes the effects
of a decrease in the multinational’s share α on optimal taxation, on both parties’ payoffs and
on the efficiency of the project:
Proposition 2 Suppose S > 0. A decrease of MNE’s share, α, of net profits reduces the
optimal tax rate T T (α). The effect on MNE’s payoff is ambiguous. For large values of α, there
exist cases where MNE benefits from giving up some share of the project to HC. The effects on
HC’s payoff and on the efficiency of the project depend on the efficiency of the spillover:
(i) β = 1: HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project are strictly increasing as α decreases.
The effects are exactly the same as for S = 0.
(ii) β < 1: HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project are strictly increasing as α decreases.
(iii) β > 1: There exist cases where HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project increase as α
increases. Moreover, there exist cases where HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project
are maximized if ownership of the project is not shared.
Proof: See Appendix.
T T (α) is strictly decreasing as α decreases. Intuitively, the lower α is, the higher is the share of
profits which goes directly to HC. In order to increase the expected profits of the joint venture
HC will restrict the imposed tax.
Proposition 2 shows that there are circumstances where a joint venture agreement is mu-
tually beneficial even in the presence of a spillover. For large values of α MNE can sometimes
benefit from giving away some share of the profit to HC without being directly compensated
for it. By sharing ownership HC is induced to impose lower taxes thereby increasing overall
efficiency and MNE’s payoff. A joint venture may hence be used to mitigate the problem of
creeping expropriation. This result can be obtained independently of the efficiency of a spillover
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even though it could be argued that an inefficient spillover should reduce the incentive for MNE
to share ownership.
We have already shown that a symmetric spillover only has an effect on the optimal tax
rate T T (α). Consequently, it is very intuitive that compared to a situation without spillovers
the effects of a change in α differ only with respect to the effect on T T (α). Because of the
spillover a decrease in α reduces the optimal tax rate more than it would without a spillover.
The other effects remain unchanged in their magnitude: A decrease in α increases the efficiency
of the project and has a strictly positive effect on HC’s payoff.
An efficient spillover extends the scope for voluntary joint venture agreements. The reason
for this is that the spillover benefits HC more than it reduces MNE’s profit. In this case MNE is
given a stronger incentive to share ownership since thereby taxation is reduced more, while the
loss due to the spillover is comparably small. HC has always an incentive to share ownership
and therefore to enjoy a share of the project’s net profits and to get access to the effective
spillover.
Surprisingly, however, we find that for β > 1, there are cases where HC benefits and the
efficiency of the project increases if α increases. Moreover, it is sometimes not in the interest
of HC nor efficient at all to share ownership. What is the reason for this result? Increasing
α reduces HC’s share of the net profit and induces HC to increase total taxation. Increasing
taxation has an indirect negative effect on the technology transfer by MNE and therefore on
the probability of a successful project. On the other hand, increasing α has a positive direct
effect on investment q since the loss due to the spillover for MNE is reduced. For sufficiently
large values of β the latter effect may become very large and outweigh the effect on the profit
share. This result gives a rationale why full ownership of the project by MNE can sometimes
be in the interest of HC even though only shared ownership gives rise to a spillover. The
finding is particularly interesting for countries in transition or Eastern European countries
where sometimes multinationals are restricted to shared ownership arrangements. As we show,
the negative effects associated with shared ownership, i.e. the reduced incentive for MNE to
further invest, can become very strong. And thus, it can be optimal for HC to restrict its own
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share of the project or even not to share ownership at all, but rather to enjoy a large expected
tax revenue.
4 Spillovers and Investment by the Host Country
Now we ask how both parties’ incentives are affected by a potential spillover if HC does not
impose a tax on the project but instead has the option to undertake some investment, M , in
order to increase the return of the project. Again, we first consider MNE’s decision on how
much to invest in the second stage of the project. MNE maximizes (3). The optimal level of
investment q is characterized by the following first order condition:
K ′(qM) = R +M − 1− α
α
βS. (7)
Note that qM(M,α) is a strictly increasing function of M for all M > 0. Note further, that it
depends directly on α because of the existence of a spillover.
When HC decides on the level of investment, M , it takes into account the effect on
qM(M,α) and thus on its own share of profits. HC maximizes (4). In the Appendix we
prove under which conditions HC’s payoff is maximized at MM(α) ∈ (M,∞), where M =
max{0, 1−α
α
βS−R}.17 Hence, the optimal investment MM(α) satisfies the following first order
condition:
dqM(M)
dM
[
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S
]
+ qM(M)(1− α)− C ′(M) = 0. (8)
Note that, if α = 1, HC will choose MM(1) = 0. Thus, the host country has an incentive to
invest in local infrastructure only if ownership of the project is shared.
How are the incentives to transfer technology and to invest in local infrastructure affected
by the potential spillover S? Intuitively, it could be argued that a potential spillover reduces the
incentive to transfer technology because it directly reduces MNE’s payoff. On the other hand,
HC is given a stronger incentive to invest in local infrastructure. Since the parties’ decisions
are interdependent a change in S has a direct effect on MM(α) and qM(M,α) and an indirect
17See Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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effect through the change in the other variable. As expected, the potential spillover S has a
direct negative effect on the technology transfer qM(M,α) and a direct positive effect on the
investment MM(α). The overall effect on the investment of HC is positive. Thus, the indirect
effect on qM(M,α) is positive and may therefore compensate for the direct negative effect of S.
Which of the effects on the optimal transfer of technology dominates is a priori not clear. The
effects of an increase in the potential spillover on both parties’ profits and on the efficiency of
the project are also ambiguous too as the following proposition states:
Proposition 3 Increasing S strictly increases the optimal investment MM(α). The effects
on the optimal investment in technology transfer qM(M,α), on both parties’ payoffs and on the
efficiency of the project are ambiguous:
dMM
dS
> 0,
dqM
dS
≥
< 0,
dUMMNE
dS
≥
< 0,
dUMHC
dS
≥
< 0,
d(UMMNE + U
M
HC)
dS
≥
< 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
In general, a spillover has, independently of its efficiency β, an effect on all variables and
therefore on both parties’ payoffs and on the efficiency of the project. Again, as in scenario
1 with taxation by HC, the presence of a potential spillover need not in general reduce the
incentive to transfer technology.
Contrary to the result in the first scenario, a spillover can affect both parties’ payoffs and
efficiency even if it is symmetric, β = 1. The reason for this result is that MM(α) reacts
differently than T T (α) in case of a symmetric spillover. The investment does not in general
perfectly compensate for the spillover and adjust the choice of qM(M,α). This is caused by the
fact that HC has to bear the investment cost C(M) alone and independently of the project’s
success or failure, while the benefit of this investment can only be enjoyed in case of success.
More surprisingly, however, a spillover can have a negative effect on both parties’ payoffs
and on the efficiency of the project if the spillover is efficient, β < 1, or a positive effect if it
is inefficient, β > 1. This is also in contrast to the results in scenario 1, where an efficient
spillover always has a positive effect on payoffs and vice versa for an inefficient spillover. In
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scenario 2, whether the spillover has a positive or negative effect depends on its impact on the
incentive to invest for HC. Whenever a potential spillover leads to a strong incentive to invest
in infrastructure the multinational is given a stronger investment incentive as well. This results
in a positive effect on payoffs. Obviously, the host country’s incentive to invest depends on
the nature of the investment costs for local infrastructure. We can conclude that the cheaper
the cost to invest in local infrastructure, or the more efficient the spillover, the more likely a
potential spillover has a positive impact on both parties’ payoffs.
How are the incentives of both parties affected by a change in the ownership structure?
Intuitively, it could be expected that decreasing the multinational’s ownership share α reduces
its incentive to transfer technology. On the other hand, the incentive for HC to invest in local
infrastructure should increase which in turn has a positive effect on the incentive for MNE.
Whether or not one of the effects dominates is ambiguous. Since the parties’ incentives are
affected by a potential spillover the effects of a change in the ownership structure should also
depend on the spillover. The following proposition summarizes the effects of a decrease in the
multinational’s share α on both parties’ payoffs and on the efficiency of the project with or
without the existence of a potential spillover:
Proposition 4 A decrease of MNE’s share, α, of net profits increases the optimal investment
MM(α). The effect on MNE’s payoff is ambiguous. For large values of α, there exist cases
where MNE benefits from giving up some share of the project to HC. The effects on HC’s payoff
and on the efficiency of the project depend on the existence of a spillover:
(i) S = 0: HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project increase as α decreases.
(ii) S > 0: There exist cases where HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project increase as
α increases.
Proof: See Appendix.
MM(α) is strictly increasing as α decreases. Intuitively, the lower α the higher the share of
profits which goes directly to HC and also the higher the share of the return on the investment
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MM(α). In order to increase the expected profits of the joint venture HC will extend its
investment.
Proposition 4 shows that in the absence of a potential spillover, S = 0, a joint venture
can be efficiency improving and beneficial for the multinational enterprise. Thus, also in this
scenario with an investment by HC instead of taxation there are circumstances where MNE
voluntarily gives away a share of the project without direct monetary compensation.18 HC has
always an incentive to share ownership since it only then enjoys a share of the project’s return
and is given an incentive to invest in local infrastructure. Consequently, the overall efficiency
also increases with a decreasing ownership share of MNE.
For S > 0 there are again cases where a joint venture agreement is mutually beneficial and
hence the multinational would voluntarily agree to it. HC has an incentive to share ownership
and is thereby given the incentive to invest. Surprisingly, however, the results divert from those
in scenario 1 in different aspects. We find that it is sometimes in the interest of HC and efficient
to restrict its ownership share to a small fraction. And moreover, this result is independent of
the efficiency of the spillover. In other words, even if the spillover is very efficient, β < 1, there
are cases where HC is not interested in holding too large a share of the project. What is the
reason for this counterintuitive result? Whether or not HC would like to hold a share of the
project depends on the exact nature of the investment cost which HC has to bear independently
of success or failure of the project. If investment in infrastructure is too expensive relative to
the return on investment, HC has only little incentive to invest. This in turn results in only a
small positive effect on the incentive to transfer technology by MNE. Moreover, there exist cases
where for a given ownership division both parties have no incentive to invest. Therefore, in this
scenario our theoretical analysis gives a rationale against a general restriction of ownership to a
specified minimum share of the domestic partner. However, if HC’s share of the project, 1−α,
can be chosen sufficiently small, both parties have an incentive to invest and the efficiency of
18Asiedu and Esfahani [2001] find evidence that any host country characteristic that increases productivity
of local assets in the project tends to lower the foreign equity share. This might be in the interest of the foreign
investor because it provides an incentive for the host country to improve its infrastructure and thereby enhance
productivity.
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the project can be maximized. The reason for this is that the smaller HC’s share 1− α is, the
smaller is the spillover and hence the smaller is the investment M needed to compensate for
the spillover. Thus, in principle, HC always has an interest to hold at least a small share of the
project.
5 Empirical Implications
With respect to the influence of a potential spillover, the model produces results which can be
straightforwardly interpreted as regards to their empirical implications. In scenario 1, we have
shown theoretically that a potential spillover has a very clearcut and intuitive influence on the
parties’ strategic decisions. Regarding the influence of the host country’s taxation policy on
the incentive for MNE to transfer technology and the influence of a potential spillover on the
taxation policy itself we can formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The larger the political risk of the host country, the smaller the incentive to
transfer technology.
Hypothesis 2 The larger the potential for a spillover, the smaller the risk of excessive taxation.
As the model’s results show, the influence of the spillover on the investment incentive for MNE
depends on the efficiency of the spillover:
Hypothesis 3 The potential for a spillover should have (a) a positive effect on the incentive
to transfer technology if the effective spillover is efficient or (b) a negative effect if the effective
spillover is inefficient.
In scenario 2 we have shown that the results for the impact on the incentive to invest are less
straightforward. Regarding the influence of the investment in local infrastructure by the host
country on the incentive to transfer technology and the effect of a potential spillover on the
investment incentive we can state the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4 The larger the investment in local infrastructure by the host country, the larger
the incentive to transfer technology.
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Hypothesis 5 The larger the potential for a spillover, the larger the incentive to invest in
infrastructure.
Concerning the influence of a potential spillover we cannot formulate an unambiguous hypoth-
esis but rather emphasize a tendency with respect to the efficiency of the effective spillover.
Hypothesis 6 The potential for a spillover should tend to have (a) a positive effect on the
incentive to transfer technology if the effective spillover is efficient or (b) a negative effect if
the effective spillover is inefficient.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
As previous studies have suggested and often argued, foreign direct investment is a source
for the diffusion of knowledge and technology. It is well recognized that sharing ownership
with a local partner can reveal a multinational’s proprietary knowledge and in that way give
rise to technology spillovers. The extent of such technology spillovers certainly depends on
the nature of the transferred technology and on the ownership structure in the joint venture.
We contribute to the literature by providing a simple model of an international joint venture
between a multinational enterprise and a host country firm. In particular, we analyzed the
effects of the potential for a spillover on the transfer of technology and on the host country’s
policy. Concerning the host country policy we considered two different scenarios: Taxation or
investment in infrastructure.
In contrast to existing arguments we showed that the potential for a spillover does not
necessarily have a negative effect on the incentive to transfer technology. There rather exist
cases in both scenarios where a potential spillover has a positive effect on the transfer of
technology and on the efficiency of the project. In the first scenario this depends crucially
on the efficiency of the spillover. Surprisingly, however, we found that in the second scenario
an efficient spillover can also have a negative effect on both parties’ profits and vice versa for
an inefficient spillover. However, besides these differing results we can still argue that a more
efficient spillover generally has a positive effect on the incentive to transfer technology and thus
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on the efficiency of the project and the other way round for an inefficient spillover.
Moreover, we examined how the incentives of both parties can be controlled through the
determination of the ownership structure in an international joint venture. We showed that
there are circumstances where a joint venture is mutually beneficial and thus the MNE volun-
tarily agrees to it. Interestingly, however, we found that it can be efficient for the host country
to restrict its ownership share in the joint venture. Furthermore, there are circumstances where
it is not in the interest of the host country nor efficient at all to share ownership. Hence, even
though a spillover occurs in our model only if the host country holds a share of the project, a
joint venture is sometimes not the optimal arrangement for the host country. This result is par-
ticularly interesting to countries in Central and Eastern Europe and transition countries, where
sharing of ownership is often required by host country governments. The reasoning for these
requirements is that in this way the diffusion of knowledge is facilitated and economic growth
is spurred. But we show that exactly the opposite can be true, namely that the negative effects
on the incentive to transfer technology dominate or the cost of investment in infrastructure is
too expensive relative to its return. In these cases the host country should actually prefer not
to foster a joint venture.
The present analysis throws some light on the question of whether or not the extent of
local participation with multinationals has an impact on the extent of spillovers. As our model
suggests, the extent of the effective spillover depends not only on the ownership structure but
also on the incentive to transfer technology and on the host country’s policy. Theses factors, on
the other hand, depend on country specific as well as industry specific determinants. Whether
or not a larger ownership share of the host country firm in turn leads to stronger spillovers
is a priori not clear and can differ across countries and industries. This observation may help
to explain why the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. While Blomstro¨m and Sjo¨holm
[1999] found no effect, Dimelis and Louri [2001] found evidence that the degree of domestic
ownership matters with respect to the magnitude of spillovers.
Possible extensions of the model could include more sophisticated specifications of the
bargaining game or the examination of the influence of other market characteristics such as
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competition in the product market. It was not the aim of this model to determine the optimal
ownership structure in an international joint venture. Despite these arguments we feel confi-
dent that our model helps to explain determining factors for the distribution of ownership in
international joint ventures. A sounder theoretical approach to this issue and empirical tests
of the proposed hypotheses are left for future research.
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Appendix
Lemma 1 For any α ∈ (0, 1), HC’s maximization problem has a unique interior solution
T T (α) ∈
(
−(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S,R− 1−α
α
βS
)
.
Proof:
We first show that HC’s profit function is strictly concave in T . By the implicit function
theorem, dq
T (T )
dT
= − 1
K′′(qT ) < 0. Differentiating U
T
HC with respect to T we get
dUTHC
dT
=
dqT (T )
dT
(1− α)[R− T −K ′(qT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (5)
+S] + T
+ αqT (T )
= − 1
K ′′(qT )
[
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + T
]
+ αqT (T ).
d2UTHC
dT 2
= − 1
K ′′
[
K ′′′
[K ′′]2
[(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + T ] + 1 + α
]
< 0.
Hence, the optimal T T (α) must be unique. Furthermore, it is never optimal to choose T ≥
R − 1−α
α
βS, because this would imply qT (T, α) = 0 and UTHC = 0, while a strictly positive
payoff can be obtained by choosing T < R − 1−α
α
βS. Finally, it cannot be optimal to choose
T = T ≡ −(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S. To see this note that at T = T we have qT (T, α) > 0.Thus,
dUTHC
dT
|T=T = αqT (T, α) > 0.
Hence, if α > 0, a strictly higher payoff can be obtained by choosing T > T .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1:
By the implicit function theorem we can show that
dqT
dS
= − 1
K ′′
[
1− α
α
β +
dT T
dS
]
.
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Using again the implicit function theorem and taking account of the direct effect of an increase
in S on q, i.e. − 1
K′′
1−α
α
β, we find that
dT T
dS
= −
K′′′
[K′′]2
dqT
dS
[(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S + T T ] + dq
T
dT
(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
+ αdq
T
dS
K′′′
[K′′]2
dqT
dT
[(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S + T T ] + dq
T
dT
+ αdq
T
dT
= −
(
1− α
α
β
) K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + 1 + αβ
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + 1 + α︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A>0
= −
(
1− α
α
β
)
A < 0, with A
≥
< 1 if β
≤
> 1.
Thus, it follows
dqT
dS
=
1
K ′′
1− α
α
β[A− 1].
Differentiating UTMNE and U
T
HC with respect to S and re-arranging we get:
dUTMNE
dS
= − qTαdT
T
dS
− qT (1− α)β
+
dqT
dS
α
[
R− T T −K ′(q)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (5)
−dq
T
dS
(1− α)βS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= qT (1− α)β[A− 1].
dUTHC
dS
=
dqT
dS
(1− α)[R− T T −K ′(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (5)
+S] + T T
+ qT
[
(1− α) + αdT
T
dS
]
=
dqT
dS
[
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + T T
]
+ qT (1− α)[1− βA].
Summarizing the effects:
(i) β = 1⇒ A = 1⇒ dTT
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
,
dUTMNE
dS
,
dUTHC
dS
= 0,⇒ d(UTMNE+UTHC)
dS
= 0
(ii) β < 1⇒ A > 1⇒ dTT
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
,
dUTMNE
dS
,
dUTHC
dS
> 0,⇒ d(UTMNE+UTHC)
dS
> 0
(iii) β > 1⇒ A < 1⇒ dTT
dS
< 0, dq
T
dS
,
dUTMNE
dS
,
dUTHC
dS
< 0,⇒ d(UTMNE+UTHC)
dS
< 0
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For β = 1 we have dq
T
dS
= 0. Thus, it follows from (5) that for β = 1 we must have T T (α) =
T ∗ − 1−α
α
S, where T ∗ characterizes the optimal choice of T for S = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
By the implicit function theorem, it is straightforward to show that
dqT
dα
= − 1
K ′′
[
dT T
dα
− 1
α2
βS
]
.
Using again the implicit function theorem and taking account of the direct effect of an increase
in α on qT (T, α), i.e. 1
K′′
1
α2
βS, we can show that
dT T
dα
=
1
α2
βS
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + 1− α2 + α
2
β
+ α
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + 1 + α︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B>0
+
qS(T )
K′′′
[K′′]3 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S + T T ] + (1 + α) 1K′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=D>0
=
1
α2
βSB +D > 0, withB
≥
< 1 for β
≤
> 1.
Differentiating UTHC with respect to α and re-arranging we get:
dUTHC
dα
=
dqT
dα
(1− α)[R− T T −K ′(qT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (5)
+S] + T T
+ αqT dT
T
dα
+ K(qT )− qT [R− T T + S]
= − 1
K ′′
[
dT T
dα
− 1
α2
βS
] (1− α)β − αβ + αα S + T T︸ ︷︷ ︸
=K′′αqT by (6)
+ αqT dT
T
dα
+ K(qT )− qT [R− T T + S]
= K(qT )− qT
[
R− T T + S
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ qT
1
α
βS︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (9)
A marginal increase of α reduces HC’s share of total surplus, qT [R−T T ]−K(qT ), and reduces
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the received spillover, qTS. On the other hand, a marginal increase of α induces HC to increase
total taxation by dT
T
dα
and it induces MNE to change investment by dq
T
dα
. Both effects sum up
to qT 1
α
βS, which is basically the direct effect of an increase in α on the investment qT . This
effect may dominate and thus HC may prefer to increase α, if β is sufficiently large. Note that
(9) can be positive only if β > 1. To see this, note further that MNE will choose qT > 0 only
if UTMNE > 0, i.e.
qTα[R− T T ]− qT (1− α)βS − αK(qT )− I > 0.
Condition (9) is positive if, after re-arranging, we have
qTα
[
R− T T
]
− qTβS + αqTS − αK(qT ) < 0.
Both conditions can be fulfilled simultaneously only if β > 1.
Differentiating UTMNE with respect to α and re-arranging we get:
dUTMNE
dα
= qT [R− T T + βS]−K(qT )− qTαdT
T
dα
+
dqT
dα
α
[
R− T T −K ′(qT )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (5)
−dq
T
dα
(1− α)βS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= qT [R− T T + βS]−K(qT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−αqT dT
T
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (10)
Thus, the impact of α on MNE’s payoff may be ambiguous. A marginal increase of α increases
MNE’s share of the total net payoff, qT [R − T T ] − K(qT ), and reduces the loss due to the
spillover, qTβS. On the other hand, a marginal increase of α induces HC to increase total taxes
by dT
T
dα
, of which MNE has to pay the share α in case of a successful project, which happens
with probability qT . If α is close enough to 0, the second effect vanishes and MNE always
prefers to increase α. However, if α is sufficiently large, the second effect may dominate. The
effect of a change of α on total surplus is given by
d(UTMNE + U
T
HC)
dα
= qT
1
α
βS − qTαdT
T
dα
+ qT (β − 1)S
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= qT
1
α
βS[1−B]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥
< 0 for β
≥
< 1
−αqTD︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ qT (β − 1)S︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥
< 0 for β
≥
< 1
. (11)
By proof of Proposition 1 we know that for β = 1, T T (α) = T ∗− 1−α
α
S and thus qT (α) = q∗(α),
where q∗(α) and T ∗(α) characterize the optimal choices for S = 0. Hence, equations (9), (10),
and (11), and therefore the effects of a decrease in α are the same for β = 1 and for S = 0.
Summarizing the effects:
(i) β = 1⇒ dTT
dα
> 0, dq
T
dα
< 0,
dUTMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUTHC
dα
< 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
< 0.
(ii) β < 1⇒ dTT
dα
> 0, dq
T
dα
< 0,
dUTMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUTHC
dα
< 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
< 0.
(iii) β > 1⇒ dTT
dα
> 0, dq
T
dα
≥
< 0,
dUTMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUTHC
dα
≥
< 0,
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
≥
< 0.
We prove by example that there indeed exist cases with the properties described in the propo-
sition. Consider the following cost function:
K(q) =
1
1− q − q.
For α = 0.98, R = 40, and S = 3 the following results are obtained for different values of β:
dUTMNE
dα
dUTHC
dα
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
qS T S UTMNE U
T
HC
β = 0.3 -0.25 -4.11 -4.36 0.65866 32.40 2.669 21.434
β = 1 -0.07 -2.72 -2.79 0.65855 32.36 2.665 21.406
β = 1.2 -0.02 -2.32 -2.34 0.65852 32.35 2.664 21.398
β = 3 0.43 1.23 1.67 0.65823 32.25 2.655 21.327
Thus, for large values of α, there exist cases where MNE’s payoff increases as α decreases. This
result can be obtained independently of the efficiency of a spillover β. For β > 1 there exist
cases where HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project increase as α increases. This is the
case for β = 3 in the example. However, for α = 1 and R = 40 we get:
dUTMNE
dα
dUTHC
dα
d(UTMNE+U
T
HC)
dα
qS T S UTMNE U
T
HC
α = 1 - - - 0.65838 32.51 24.921 21.352
Hence, in some cases HC benefits and the efficiency of the project is maximized if ownership is
not shared.
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Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 For any α ∈ (0, 1), HC’s payoff is maximized at MM(α), with
(a) MM(α) ∈ (0,∞), if R > 1−α
α
βS and
d2UMHC
dM2
|M=MM < 0, or
(b) MM(α) ∈ (1−α
α
βS −R,∞), if R ≤ 1−α
α
βS,
d2UMHC
dM2
|M=MM < 0, and UMHC(MM) > 0, or
(c) MM = 0, if R ≤ 1−α
α
βS otherwise.
Proof:
By the implicit function theorem, dq
M (M)
dM
= 1
K′′(qM ) > 0. Differentiating U
M
HC with respect to
M we get
dUMHC
dM
=
dqM
dM
(1− α)
R +M −K ′(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (7)
+S
+ qM(1− α)− C ′(M)
=
1
K ′′(qM)
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + qM(M)(1− α)− C ′(M).
d2UMHC
dM2
= − 1
K ′′
[
K ′′′
[K ′′]2
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S − (1− α)
]
− C ′′(M).
Hence, HC’s payoff is maximized atMM(α), if
d2UMHC
dM2
|M=MM < 0 and if moreover UMHC(MM) > 0.
Given the assumptions on C(M) there must exist an upper bound for MM .
If α < 1 and R > 1−α
α
βS, it is never optimal to choose M = 0. To see this note that in
this case qM > 0 and thus
dUMHC
dM
∣∣∣∣
M=0
=
1
K ′′(qM)
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + qM(M)(1− α) > 0.
Hence, if α ∈ (0, 1), a strictly higher payoff can be obtained by choosing M > 0.
If α < 1 and R ≤ 1−α
α
βS, it follows from (7) that q = 0 for all M ≤ 1−α
α
βS − R. Hence,
HC chooses MM ∈ (1−α
α
βS −R,∞) if UMHC(MM) > 0 and MM = 0 otherwise.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3:
By the implicit function theorem we can show that
dqM
dS
= − 1
K ′′
[
1− α
α
β − dM
M
dS
]
.
Using again the implicit function theorem and taking account of the direct effect of an increase
in S on qM(M,α), i.e. − 1
K′′
1−α
α
βS, we find that
dMM
dS
= −
− K′′′
[K′′]2
dqM
dS
(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S + dq
M
dM
(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
+ dq
M
dS
(1− α)
− K′′′
[K′′]2
dqM
dM
(1− α)β−αβ+α
α
S + dq
M
dM
(1− α)− C ′′
=
1− α
α
β
K′′′
[K′′]2 (1− α)β−αβ+αα S + αβ
K′′′
[K′′]2 (1− α)β−αβ+αα S − (1− α) +K ′′C ′′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E>0
> 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that the denominator has to be positive by Lemma 2
if HC’s payoff is maximized at MM(α). And it follows
dqM
dS
=
1
K ′′
1− α
α
β[E − 1] ≥< 0.
Differentiating UMMNE and U
M
HC with respect to S and re-arranging we get:
dUMMNE
dS
=
dqM
dS
α [R +M −K ′(qM)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (7)
−dq
M
dS
(1− α)βS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ qMα
dMM
dS
− qM(1− α)β
= qM(1− α)β[E − 1] ≥< 0.
dUMHC
dS
=
dqM
dS
(1− α)
R +M −K ′(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (7)
+S
+ qM(1− α)dM
M
dS
+ qM(1− α)− C ′(M)dM
M
dS
= − 1
K ′′
[
1− α
α
β − dM
M
dS
]
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S + qM(1− α)dM
M
dS
27
+ qM(1− α)− C ′(M)dM
M
dS
= − 1
K ′′
(1− α)2
α
(
β − αβ + α
α
)
βS + qM(1− α) ≥< 0.
The effect of a change in S on total surplus is given by
d(UMMNE + U
M
HC)
dS
= qM(1− α)β[E − 1]− 1
K ′′
(1− α)2
α
β − αβ + α
α
βS
+ qM(1− α) ≥< 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
By the implicit function theorem we can show that
dqM
dα
=
1
K ′′
[
dMM
dα
+
1
α2
βS
]
.
Using again the implicit function theorem and taking account of the direct effect of an increase
in α on qM(M,α), i.e. 1
K′′
1
α2
βS, we can show that
dMM
dα
= − 1
α2
βS
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S] + α− α2 + α
2
β
K′′′
[K′′]2 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S]− (1− α) +K ′′C ′′
− q
M(M)
K′′′
[K′′]3 [(1− α)β−αβ+αα S]− (1− α) 1K′′ + C ′′
< 0.
The last inequality follows from the fact that the denominator has to be positive by Lemma 2
if HC’s payoff is maximized at MM(α). Differentiating UMHC and U
M
MNE with respect to α and
re-arranging we get:
dUMHC
dα
=
dqM
dα
(1− α)
R +M −K ′(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (7)
+S
+ qM(1− α)dM
M
dα
− C ′(M)dM
M
dα
+K(qM)− qM [R +MM + S]
=
1
K ′′
[
dMM
dα
+
1
α2
βS
]
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α
S
+
dMM
dα
[
qM(1− α)− C ′(M)
]
+K(qM)− qM [R +MM + S]
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= K(qM)− qM [R +MM + S]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
1
K ′′
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α3
βS2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (12)
Thus, the impact of α on HC’s payoff is, independently of the efficiency of the spillover β,
ambiguous. A marginal increase of α reduces HC’s share of total surplus, K(qM)−qM [R+MM ]
and reduces the received spillover qMS. On the other hand, a marginal increase of α induces HC
to reduce its investment in infrastructure by dM
M
dα
and it induces MNE to change investment by
dqM
dα
. Both effects sum up to the second expression in (12). This effect may dominate depending
on the exact nature of investment costs.
dUMMNE
dα
= qM [R +MM + βS]−K(qM) + αqM dM
M
dα
+
dqM
dα
α[R +M −K ′(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1−α
α
βS by (7)
]− dq
M
dα
(1− α)βS
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= qM [R +MM + βS]−K(qM)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+αqM
dMM
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
The impact of α on MNE’s payoff may also be ambiguous. A marginal increase of α increases
MNE’s share of total net payoff, qM [R+MM ]−K(qM) and reduces the loss due to the spillover
by qMβS. On the other hand, a marginal increase of α induces HC to reduce its investment in
infrastructure by dM
M
dα
, of which MNE enjoys the share α in case of a successful project, which
happens with probability qM . If α is close to 0, the second effect vanishes and MNE always
prefers to increase α. However, if α is sufficiently large, the second effect may dominate. The
effect of a change in α on total surplus is given by
d(UMMNE + U
M
HC)
dα
= qM(β − 1)S︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥
< 0 for β
≥
< 1
+
1
K ′′
(1− α)β − αβ + α
α3
βS2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+αqM
dMM
dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
Summarizing the effects:
(i) S = 0⇒ dMM
dα
< 0, dq
M
dα
< 0,
dUMMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUMHC
dα
< 0,
d(UMMNE+U
M
HC)
dα
< 0.
(ii) S > 0⇒ dMM
dα
< 0, dq
M
dα
≥
< 0,
dUMMNE
dα
≥
< 0,
dUMHC
dα
≥
< 0,
d(UMMNE+U
M
HC)
dα
≥
< 0.
29
We prove by example that there indeed exist cases with the properties described in the propo-
sition. Consider the following cost functions:
K(q) =
1
3
q3 and C(M) =M2.
For α = 0.98, R = 0.1, and S = 20 the following results are obtained for different values of β:
dUMMNE
dα
dUMHC
dα
d(UMMNE+U
M
HC)
dα
qM MM UMMNE U
M
HC
β = 0.4 -0.92 -4.62 -5.54 0.423 0.242 0.05 0.11
β = 0.8 0.03 4.32 4.35 0.315 0.326 0.02 0.02
β = 0.9 - - - 0 0 0 0
Thus, for large values of α, there exist cases where MNE’s payoff increases as α decreases.
Moreover, there exist cases where HC’s payoff and the efficiency of the project increase as α
increases. As the example highlights this can be the case even for an efficient spillover. For
β = 0.9 sharing of ownership with α = 0.98 results in no investment by both parties. However,
for α = 0.99, R = 0.1, and S = 20 we get:
dUMMNE
dα
dUMHC
dα
d(UMMNE+U
M
HC)
dα
qM MM UMMNE U
M
HC
β = 0.9 0.19 0.18 0.37 0.298 0.171 0.02 0.03
Q.E.D.
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